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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






EUGENE MARTIN LAVERGNE, 
                                     Appellant 
v. 
 
JOHN BRYSON, in his official capacity as the Secretary  
of the United States Department of Commerce; 
JOHN GROVER, in his official capacity as the Director  
of the United States Census Bureau; 
KAREN L. HAAS, in her official capacity as the Clerk  
of the United States House of Representatives; 
JOHN BOEHNER, in his official capacity as the Speaker  
of the United States House of Representatives; 
DANIEL INOUYE, in his official capacity as the President Pro Tempore  
of the United States Senate; 
JOSEPH BIDEN; in his official capacity as the President of the Senate; 
DAVID FERRIERO, in his official capacity as the Archivist of the United States 
of America 
_____________ 
    
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of  New Jersey 
(No. 3-11-cv-07117) 
District Judge: The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 14, 2012 
 




                                                          
* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting 
by designation. 
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(Filed: September 20, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
 
PER CURIAM  
 Eugene Martin LaVergne, proceeding pro se,1 appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his request to convene 
a three-judge panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 and dismissing his complaint.  We 
summarily affirm.  See
I. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 LaVergne, a New Jersey citizen and registered voter, alleges in this suit that 
the method of congressional apportionment under 2 U.S.C. § 2a is unconstitutional.  
LaVergne asserts that the method violates (1) separation of powers, (2) the 
nondelegation doctrine, (3) the principle of “one person, one vote,” and (4) 
“Article the First,” an amendment to the United States Constitution proposed in 
1789 that LaVergne asserts was ratified and is part of the Constitution.  LaVergne 
sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction ordering the leaders of Congress 
to enact an apportionment plan consistent with Article the First’s ratio of one 
member of Congress per 50,000 citizens and ordering the Vice-President of the 
                                                          
1 Although LaVergne is pro se, he received his license to practice law in New Jersey in 1990.  His license 
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United States to count 15 electoral votes for New Jersey in the 2012 presidential 
election.  The relief LaVergne sought would expand the House of Representatives 
from the 435-member size that has been statutorily set since the 1910s to over 
6,160 members.   
 On December 16, 2011, the District Court on its own denied LaVergne’s 
application for a show-cause order and his request for a three-judge panel, and 
dismissed the case.  LaVergne timely appealed.  In this court, LaVergne moved for 
a preliminary injunction, an expedited appeal, and an expedited initial en banc 
review or panel review.  This court denied the motions. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s order dismissing the complaint is plenary.  Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal
III. 
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  We may summarily affirm if an appeal presents 
no substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was temporarily suspended in January 2011and indefinitely suspended by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in July 2011.  In re LaVergne, 21 A.3d 1181 (N.J. 2011). 
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 This appeal presents two threshold issues: standing and justiciability.  The 
District Court concluded that LaVergne lacked standing because, among other 
reasons, he did not suffer the injury he complained about.  The District Court 
concluded that, if there was an injury, it was only to certain government officials, 
such as the governor of New Jersey, who is responsible for implementing 
redistricting under § 2a; New Jersey members of the House of Representatives, 
who could lose their congressional seats as a result of redistricting; or certain 
presidential candidates, who would want New Jersey to have a larger number of 
electoral votes.  (See A5).  LaVergne disagrees with that conclusion, relying on 
Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).  
In that case, the Supreme Court held that state voters’ “expected loss of a 
Representative to the United States Congress” based on redistricting ordered under 
§ 2a “undoubtedly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing.”  
Id. at 331.  But in that case, statistical evidence showed that the plaintiffs’ votes 
would be diluted through the loss of a congressional seat to another state.  See id. 
at 331–34; see also Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(interpreting House of Representatives).  Here, by contrast, the relief LaVergne 
seeks would result in every state, based on its population, gaining congressional 
seats under Article the First.  The result would be an increase for each state in the 
same proportion as the present method produces.  If there will be “dilution” to 
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LaVergne’s vote when New Jersey is redistricted using the § 2a apportionment 
method, LaVergne’s proposed solution would neither affect it nor change the size 
of New Jersey’s congressional delegation relative to the size of other states’ 
delegations.   
 In addition to this problem, LaVergne at most alleges “a type of institutional 
injury”—an allegedly unconstitutionally low number of representatives—“which 
necessarily damages” all United States voters “equally.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 
811, 821 (1997); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74  
(1992) (explaining that the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff . . 
. seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the 
public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy”).  He “has not 
alleged a sufficiently personal injury to establish standing[.]”  Schaffer, 240 F.3d at 
885 (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 821).  Cf. also Clemons v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce
 LaVergne’s claims also fail on other grounds, including lack of justiciability. 
LaVergne’s constitutional challenge to § 2a is primarily based on his argument that 
the apportionment method violates Article the First.  He alleges that this proposed 
constitutional amendment was ratified by the states in November 1791 or June 
1792.  Putting aside the considerable factual and historical problems with his 
, 131 S. Ct. 821 (2010) (summarily ordering voters’ constitutional 
challenge to § 2a dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). 
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argument, “[t]he issue of whether a constitutional amendment has been properly 
ratified is a political question.”  United States v. McDonald, 919 F.2d 146, 1990 
WL 186103 (table), at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939)).  In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “the question 
of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as a 
political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate 
authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the 
adoption of the amendment.”   307 U.S. at 450.  See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that “the political department has always 
determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by 
the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision”); United 
States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 463 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the issue of 
“the validity of an amendment’s ratification [is] a non-justiciable political 
question” and citing, among other cases, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 
(1922), and Coleman
 LaVergne also argues that the § 2a apportionment method violates the 
nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers.  To the extent that these 
arguments present justiciable questions,
, 307 U.S. at 450). 
2
                                                          
2  See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456–59 (1992) (rejecting the government’s 
contention that a constitutional challenge to § 2a presented a nonjusticiable question because the 
challenge was to whether “specific congressional action”—the enactment of § 2a—violated constitutional 
principles); but cf. Clemons, 131 S. Ct. 821 (summarily ordering that voters’ constitutional challenge to 
§ 2a—which the three-judge district court had determined was justiciable—be dismissed for lack of 
 they fail on the merits.  As to the first 
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argument, the Supreme Court has recognized that “in our increasingly complex 
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”  United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 575 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).  Congress may 
“endow a coordinate branch of government with a measure of discretion” if the 
delegation includes “‘an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.’”  Id. 
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  
Section 2a clearly contains an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of 
delegated authority: “the method of equal proportions,” which is automatic in 
character and which provides “procedural and substantive rules that are 
consistently applied year after year[.]”  Montana
 LaVergne’s separation-of-powers argument similarly fails.  The Supreme 
Court’s “separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on the danger of 
one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch.”  
, 503 U.S. at 465.  LaVergne’s 
nondelegation argument is meritless. 
Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).  Congress acted within its authority by 
delegating the ministerial tasks of implementing the method of equal proportions, 
for redistricting, to the Department of Commerce and its employees.  Cf. also





 Finally, LaVergne’s appeal of the District Court’s order denying his request 
to convene a three-judge panel is limited to passing references to that issue.  (
, 503 U.S. at 465 (holding, with regard to § 2a, that there is “no 
constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from adopting such a sensible 
procedure”). 
See 
Opening Br. at 5, 6 n.1, 9, 29–30).  Such cursory presentation waives the issue on 
appeal.  See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“We have held on numerous occasions that an issue is waived unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an 
issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted)); John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp.
IV. 
, 
119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.) (“[A]rguments raised in passing 
(such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”).  
Moreover, LaVergne does not seek reversal on this basis, or remand, but rather 
states that this three-judge panel’s review of his claims suffices.  (Opening Br. at 
30).    
 This appeal does not raise a substantial question.  We summarily affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
